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The Journal of Accountancy
Official Organ of the American Institute of Accountants
a. p. richardson,

Editor

EDITORIAL
In the March issue of The Journal
Accountancy there was opportunity
to do little more than to mention the fact
that the supreme court of Illinois in a decision rendered February
18th had declared unconstitutional the accountancy law enacted
in 1925. The action of the court has been acclaimed by account
ants generally because it renders inoperative a law which was
considered inimical to the best interests of the profession. There
were many features of the law which were utterly undesirable and
it is cause for gratification that the court has rendered its decision
as it has—although it is almost inconceivable that any other
decision could have been reached. The grounds upon which the
constitutionality of the act were attacked seem to be compelling.
In its decision the court says:

The Illinois Decision

of

Appellants contend that the accountancy act is unconstitutional for
the reason that it violates section 22 of article 4 of the constitution,
prohibiting special privileges, and the fourteenth amendment to the con
stitution of the United States, in that it denies equal protection of the laws.
It is also contended that the act is an unreasonable exercise of the police
power. In support of the first contention it is pointed out that the act
confers a special privilege on a limited class of persons, namely, those
persons who on the first of October, 1925, were holding certificates as
certified public accountants, and those who under the reciprocity provision
in section 9 hold unrevoked certificates as certified public accountants
from other states or such as are included in section 11, and that no other
person may practise in Illinois as certified public accountant and no
citizen of the state may become such under the act. If this complaint
is well founded the act is invalid as contravening section 22 of article 4
of the constitution of this state, which provides: “The general assembly
shall not pass local or special laws . . . granting to any corporation,
association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or
franchise whatever.” An examination of the act shows that no provision
is made for licensing any citizen of Illinois as a certified public accountant
who was not such at the time the act went into effect. The only provision
for the issuance of a certificate by the department of registration and
education in case of examination, or to any one after October 1, 1925,
other than persons holding foreign certificates or certificates under the
act of 1903, is found in section 6, where it is provided that each candidate
who passes the examination shall receive a certificate of his qualifications
to practise as a public accountant and he shall be qualified and known as
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a public accountant. Section 4, of the act provides that anyone who
shall receive a certificate of his qualifications to practise as a certified
public accountant under the act may be known and styled as such, and
no other person may assume the title or use the insignia thereof, either by
words or letters. Under the act the only persons, other than those
holding foreign certificates, who may receive certificates as certified
public accountants are those who were certified public accountants on
October 1, 1925. By section 3 any person who has received a certificate
from the department entitling him to practise as a public accountant may
be known as such and no other person shall assume that title. While the
examinations provided for in section 6 take no account of distinctions
between public accountants and certified public accountants, by section
4 a person who receives a certificate as a “public accountant” may not
hold himself out as a “certified public accountant”, for as we have seen,
the language of that section, is “no other person” shall assume the title
or use the insignia of the title of certified public accountant. The qualifica
tions prescribed by sections 3 and 4 of the act for public accountant
and certified public accountant are the same except the requirement that
the certificate of the board be had, which in section 3 is a certificate as
public accountant and in section 4 a certificate as a certified public account
ant. It appears clear, therefore, that the act necessarily operates to the
advantage of the few persons who held certificates as certified public
accountants prior to October 1, 1925, and those holding such certificates
from an outside state, and discriminates against all other persons engaged
in the business of accountancy, none of whom can ever become a certified
public accountant in this state. An accountant who is employed by more
than one employer, thereby under section 2 of the act practising public
accountancy, or one who is certified as a public accountant who desires
to take an examination and have issued to him a certificate showing that
he is a certified public accountant, finds in the act no means of accomplish
ing that end. The department is by the act given no authority to issue
any certificate except that of public accountant.

It would seem that the evidence of dis
crimination to which the court refers in
the foregoing comment is all that could
be required to render the act unconstitutional, but there are other
and almost equally cogent reasons for the action of the court.
Let us quote further:
Other Grounds
for Judgment

There is another unreasonable discrimination appearing in the act.
By section 13, as we have seen, examinations are waived and certificates
must be issued to any person who is a citizen of the United States or has
duly declared his intention to become such, who resides in this state and
who applies on or before October 1, 1925, for a certificate permitting him
to practise as a public accountant, provided such person shall on July 1,
1925, be practising as a public accountant on his own account or shall
have had five years’ experience in the employ of either a certified public
accountant or a public accountant. By this act, one who on June 30,
1925, commences practising as a public accountant on his own account
may register as such on or before October 1, 1925, because he was practis
ing as a public accountant on his own account on July 1, 1925, and this
though he shall have had no previous experience, while one who has had
four years and eleven months’ experience in the employ of either a certified
public accountant or a public accountant cannot receive a certificate as
public accountant without examination. There is no reasonable basis for
the discrimination between such two persons. While a statute intended
to be prospective may provide that it shall not apply to those already in
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the occupation to be licensed, under conditions named (People v. Logan,
284 Ill. 83; People v. Evans, 247 id. 547; Williams v. People, 121 id. 84;),
such exemption must be made to apply equally to all similarly situated.
Again, by section 9 of the act a person holding a certificate as a certified
public accountant of another state or territory who desires to be registered
and receive a certificate as a certified public accountant of this state must
pay the sum of $25, and if he would escape examination he must satisfy
the department that the state issuing the certificate to him has require
ments equal to those of this state and that the applicant is qualified to
that extent, though under section 11 one who holds a certificate of certified
public accountant of another state or territory may come into this state
and practise by registering and paying the annual license fee of five dollars.
So far as the provisions of the act are concerned, he may move into the
state and continue his business as a certified public accountant without
the certificate of the department that he is qualified as such and without
inquiry on its part as to the requirements of the state issuing the certificate
to him. It is thus seen that in the second case a certified public account
ant under a foreign certificate merely by registering and paying the annual
fee has all the benefits of the act that would flow to such certified public
accountant who desires to have or has the certificate of the department
of this state. Again by section 12 public accountants are subject to a
penalty should they practise when their annual license fee is ten days
overdue, though no such penalty is imposed on certified public accountants.
A statute cannot be sustained which applies to some persons or cases and
does not apply to all persons and cases not essentially different in kind.

So far the great majority of accounting
practitioners will be in thorough accord
with the judgment of the court, but
there may be a wide difference of opinion with regard to some of
the further expressions used by Justice Stone, speaking for the
court. For example, the court felt that the exercise of the police
power of the state could not be extended to include the practice
of the “business of accounting.” The judgment says in effect
that accounting is a matter of personal and not of public interest,
and therefore it does not affect the public health, comfort, safety
or welfare. We read: “It is readily seen that the profession of
law by reason of its influence on the safety of the rights of property
and liberty does affect the public welfare; that the science of
medicine, surgery and other treatment of human ills or the pre
vention of disease directly affects the public health; and that the
manner of construction of buildings may well be said to affect the
public safety. What is there in the business of accounting upon
which the exercise of the police power may be based?” Then,
“An ‘accountant,’ as that term is defined by standard lexicogra
phers, is one who is skilled in, keeps or adjusts accounts. Ac
counting is defined as the act or system of making up or stating
accounts. It is readily seen that an incompetent accountant may
render an inaccurate report and cause his employer to make a
business error. This creates no effect upon the public, however,

Accountancy and
Public Welfare
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unless the relationship existing between the public welfare and
the private business so affected is so close as to establish that
influence.” One of our quarrels with the lexicographers is that
they are for the most part of an earlier generation. It is a rather
remarkable fact that in recent editions of some dictionaries there
has been conscientious effort to amend definitions of a scientific
character so as to include the results of recent acquisition of
knowledge, but in all that relates to accounting the revisors of our
dictionaries seem to be content to rest upon tradition. What was
defined years ago, before public accounting existed, is regarded as
good enough for today. Apparently the court of Illinois has
been rather too strongly influenced by the effect of those so-called
standard lexicographers. The accountant today is one who “is
skilled in, keeps and adjusts accounts” and does a host of other
things as well which were not dreamt of in the philosophy of the
middle of the nineteenth century. We maintain that the practice
of accountancy in its modern form has a direct and also an indirect
bearing upon public welfare. It is a point which need hardly be
argued with accountants, but apparently it has not yet dawned
upon some members of the legal profession that the whole struc
ture of modern business rests heavily upon a foundation of sure
and accurate accounting. We do not attempt to express any
opinion as to whether the application of the police power may
be brought into play with propriety and effect in the control of
public accounting, but we do most vehemently assert that it is no
less than folly to deny the tremendous importance of good ac
counting to the public welfare.

Regulatory Laws
Benefit Public

Later in the decision the court, speaking
of certified public accountant laws, used
this striking sentence:

“These laws have been passed in the interest of those engaged in the
business and for their protection and advantage rather than in the interest
of the public welfare.”

This quotation might be amended and condensed and be more
to the point if it were written:
“These laws have been passed in the interest of those engaged in busi
ness.”

Of course, the regulation of the profession is for the protection of
the profession, and those who have been instrumental in obtaining
legislation have doubtless been chiefly animated by a desire to
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establish the status of their calling, but we do not believe that
legislators who have enacted the statutes have thought so much
about the effect upon accountants as they have of the effect upon
general business. If all and sundry, good, bad and indifferent,
are permitted to practise accountancy—and this is what the
Illinois decision practically means—it is essential that there
should be some way to discriminate between those who are in
competent and those who may reasonably be presumed to be
competent. The establishment of a line of demarcation between
the competent and incompetent is certainly more for the good of
the public as a whole than it is for those men and women who
are engaged in accountancy.
The decision proceeds to quote all the
well-known cases in which public ac
counting has been concerned and then
sums up its conclusions in the following important paragraph:

Court Considers
Restrictive Laws

We do not say that it is beyond the power of the general assembly to
enact a statute requiring that no one shall use the term “certified public
accountant” or the term “public accountant” without having met the
requirements of such an act. Such a provision may be well within the
power of the legislature on the ground that it is to the public interest that
no one shall use a term indicating that he has been examined and certified
as an accountant when such is not the fact. Of such character was the
accountancy act of 1903, herein referred to. By section 6 of that act
anyone who represented himself to the public as having received the
certificate provided by the act, or who made use of the term “certified
public accountant" or its abbreviation, was declared guilty of a mis
demeanor. Such is a misrepresentation which the legislature may prevent
by statute. There is, as we view it, however, a wide difference between
acts of such character and one which provides that no one who has not
received a certificate as public accountant from the department of registra
tion and education shall be allowed to work at the business or occupation
of accountancy for more than one person. Such an act does not spring
from a demand for the protection of the public welfare, but is an un
warranted regulation of private business and the right of the citizen to
pursue the ordinary occupations of life. For these reasons it was error to
sustain the demurrer and dismiss the bill.

Without pausing to do more than men
tion the archaic unwillingness of the
court to recognize accountancy as a
profession which is made evident in the phrase, “the business
or occupation of accountancy,” it may be inferred that the de
cision against the Illinois law of 1925 is rather against that statute
because of its discrimination and unfairness than because of
requirements restricting practice of the profession in certain ways.
In other words, the Illinois decision may not have any bearing
Illinois Situation
Unlike Others
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upon such restrictive legislation as that which has been enacted
in Maryland. The weaknesses which apparently led the Illinois
court to destroy the 1925 act of that state are not found in some of
the other statutes or bills designed to restrict the practice of
accountancy. Indeed, the court goes so far as to recognize that
legislation may regulate the profession, and in this admission of
public interest there seems to be a slight discrepancy between
the arguments in the beginning of the decision and in the con
clusion. However, the great point is that the Illinois law of 1925
is no longer operative, and it is perhaps captious to cavil at the
terms of the decision.

In response to many requests the treas
ury department extended the time for
filing definitive returns of income in the
case of all taxpayers having incomes of over $5,000 to May 15th,
merely requiring that a tentative return be filed on March 15th,
accompanied by payment of one quarter of the estimated tax.
This ruling was made almost necessary by the late date at which
the new tax law was enacted, but there have been times in the
past when a similar condition prevailed and the treasury was
unwilling to grant a general extension. Therefore we may assume
that light shines more clearly in the treasury today than it did
in some of the earlier years. The American Institute of Ac
countants and many other interested parties urgently requested
the granting of extension, but it must be confessed that there
was not any serene and confident hope that the efforts would
succeed. Consequently the announcement from the treasury
was received not only with joy but with some astonishment. It is
an evidence of the increasing harmony between the taxpayer
and the administrative offices of the government. Some ac
countants had expressed the hope that it might be possible to
obtain a general extension without even a tentative return, but
such a request was not favored by the Institute for the very
obvious reason that the government requires payment of tax
on the 15th of March in order to meet its obligations and to carry
out its budgetary promises. The filing to a tentative return may
in some cases be somewhat of a burden, but on the other hand
a far greater burden would be placed upon the fiscal officers of
the government if they were expected to carry on without funds
upon which they had been relying.
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The new law was passed with commend
able rapidity and for the most part in
acceptable form. Its full effect was not
understood at the time of its passage, but as taxpayers began to
make out their returns and to compute their taxes the extent of
the reduction began to dawn and most of us are experiencing a
sense of relief which is likely to linger. If the average American
taxpayer will take the trouble now to compare his burdens with
those carried by residents of other countries, he will regard himself
as one of the most fortunate of mankind. The man who now
receives an annual income of less than $20,000 is paying a tax
of quite reasonable amount. And another great source of rejoic
ing in the public mind is the abolition of the utterly vile provisions
of the precedent law relative to the publicity of tax returns. If
the sixty-ninth congress does nothing more during the rest of its
life it has deserved the thanks of the whole country for putting an
end to a law under which there was neither privacy nor decency.
Merits of New
Tax Law

One of the questions most frequently
Verification of Accounts
considered
by public accountants is the
Receivable
verification of balances of accounts
receivable. It is the general opinion that there should be at least a
test of the balances even if a complete verification is not possible
or perhaps desirable. Much depends upon the magnitude of the
list of receivables, but it is regarded as standard practice for
the auditor to satisfy himself that the balances are as shown by the
books. In view of this fact the following letter written by an
officer of one of the large corporations in New York is sig
nificant :
Editor, The Journal of Accountancy
Sir: The question is frequently raised as to the extent to which the
balances of accounts receivable are verified by auditors by independent
requests for confirmation addressed by them to the customers of their
clients.
It occurred to me to have a record kept of the number of such requests
received by us round about the end of the year when the great majority
of business concerns close their books.
At December 31st, when we closed our accounts, we had over 1,000 open
balances on our accounts payable ledger. Of these 76 were for amounts
in excess of $1,000, the largest amount being between $11,000 and $12,000.
I do not of course know how many of the people from whom we make
purchases have their accounts regularly audited, but we are buying from
a great many large and well managed concerns, among whom it is reason
able to suppose a substantial number have their accounts audited.
It is therefore rather significant that we received only four requests
for confirmation around the end of the year. It is true we endeavor to
keep our accounts closely paid up, and in the majority of cases an auditor
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would find at the time he made his audit that our account at the end of
the preceding month had already been paid. This condition, however,
should have no bearing upon the desirability for confirming the balance
actually outstanding at the end of the month.
I wonder how this experience agrees with that of other large companies?

It would be interesting to hear from readers of The Journal of
Accountancy, especially from those who are controllers or other
financial officers of corporations, whether their experiences coin
cide with that of the writer of the foregoing letter.
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